Zero-Knowledge Protocols for Code-Based Public-Key Encryption

Rong HU  Kirill MOROZOV  Tsuyoshi TAKAGI  

IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences   Vol.E98-A    No.10    pp.2139-2151
Publication Date: 2015/10/01
Online ISSN: 1745-1337
DOI: 10.1587/transfun.E98.A.2139
Type of Manuscript: PAPER
Category: Cryptography and Information Security
proof of plaintext knowledge,  verifiable encryption,  Niederreiter PKE,  McEliece PKE,  zero-knowledge proof,  

Full Text: PDF(886.4KB)>>
Buy this Article

Code-based public-key encryption schemes (PKE) are the candidates for post-quantum cryptography, since they are believed to resist the attacks using quantum algorithms. The most famous such schemes are the McEliece encryption and the Niederreiter encryption. In this paper, we present the zero-knowledge (ZK) proof systems for proving statements about data encrypted using these schemes. Specifically, we present a proof of plaintext knowledge for both PKE's, and also a verifiable McEliece PKE. The main ingredients of our constructions are the ZK identification schemes by Stern from Crypto'93 and by Jain, Krenn, Pietrzak, and Tentes from Asiacrypt'12.