Round Addition DFA on SPN Block Ciphers

Hideki YOSHIKAWA  Masahiro KAMINAGA  Arimitsu SHIKODA  Toshinori SUZUKI  

IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences   Vol.E97-A   No.12   pp.2671-2674
Publication Date: 2014/12/01
Online ISSN: 1745-1337
DOI: 10.1587/transfun.E97.A.2671
Type of Manuscript: LETTER
Category: Cryptography and Information Security
differential fault analysis (DFA),  round addition,  block cipher,  SPN block cipher,  AES,  KLEIN,  LED,  

Full Text: PDF(468KB)>>
Buy this Article

A method of round addition attack on substitution-permutation network (SPN) block ciphers using differential fault analysis (DFA) is presented. For the 128-bit advanced encryption standard (AES), we show that secret keys can be extracted using one correct ciphertext and two faulty ciphertexts. Furthermore, we evaluate the success rate of a round addition DFA attack, experimentally. The proposed method can also be applied to lightweight SPN block cipher such as KLEIN and LED.