An Auction Based Distribute Mechanism for P2P Adaptive Bandwidth Allocation

Fang ZUO

IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information and Systems   Vol.E96-D    No.12    pp.2704-2712
Publication Date: 2013/12/01
Online ISSN: 1745-1361
DOI: 10.1587/transinf.E96.D.2704
Print ISSN: 0916-8532
Type of Manuscript: Special Section PAPER (Special Section on Parallel and Distributed Computing and Networking)
game theory,  congestion pricing,  credit incentives,  hotspot avoidance,  bandwidth allocation in P2P networks,  

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In P2P applications, networks are formed by devices belonging to independent users. Therefore, routing hotspots or routing congestions are typically created by an unanticipated new event that triggers an unanticipated surge of users to request streaming service from some particular nodes; and a challenging problem is how to provide incentive mechanisms to allocation bandwidth more fairly in order to avoid congestion and other short backs for P2P QoS. In this paper, we study P2P bandwidth game — the bandwidth allocation in P2P networks. Unlike previous works which focus either on routing or on forwarding, this paper investigates the game theoretic mechanism to incentivize node's real bandwidth demands and propose novel method that avoid congestion proactively, that is, prior to a congestion event. More specifically, we define an incentive-compatible pricing vector explicitly and give theoretical proofs to demonstrate that our mechanism can provide incentives for nodes to tell the true bandwidth demand. In order to apply this mechanism to the P2P distribution applications, we evaluate our mechanism by NS-2 simulations. The simulation results show that the incentive pricing mechanism can distribute the bandwidth fairly and effectively and can also avoid the routing hotspot and congestion effectively.