Pricing-Based Dynamic Spectrum Leasing: A Hierarchical Multi-Stage Stackelberg Game Perspective

Chungang YANG  Jiandong LI  

IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Communications   Vol.E96-B   No.6   pp.1511-1521
Publication Date: 2013/06/01
Online ISSN: 1745-1345
DOI: 10.1587/transcom.E96.B.1511
Print ISSN: 0916-8516
Type of Manuscript: PAPER
Category: Wireless Communication Technologies
cognitive radio network,  dynamic spectrum leasing,  Stackelberg equilibrium,  power control,  

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Dynamic spectrum leasing (DSL) is regarded as a promising dynamic spectrum sharing (DSS) scheme both to improve the spectrum revenue of primary users (PUs) and to guarantee the QoS of secondary users (SUs). A pricing-based DSL termed PBDSL is formulated as a Stackelberg DSL game model, where PUs as players entering the interacting game with multiple SUs. The strategic design contains both optimal spectrum pricing schemes (including unit spectrum/interference price and interference sensitivity distributed adjustments) of PUs for the specific shared/leased spectrum and optimal transmission strategies (e.g., transmit power and bandwidth) of SUs. To capture two types of competition relationships among multiple SUs and between SUs and PUs, we investigate two intra-game models of multiple PUs and SUs, respectively, which interact with each other to constitute the final Stackelberg DSL game. The existence and uniqueness of Stackelberg equilibrium solution (SES) are analyzed and proved for presented games, based on which a joint multi-stage PBDSL algorithm is presented to approximate the optimal equilibrium strategies. Numerical results demonstrate the convergence property of the interactive decision-making process, and verify the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm, in a comparison with the Nash equilibrium solution (NES)-based approach.