Evolutionarily and Neutrally Stable Strategies in Multicriteria Games

Tomohiro KAWAMURA  Takafumi KANAZAWA  Toshimitsu USHIO  

IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences   Vol.E96-A   No.4   pp.814-820
Publication Date: 2013/04/01
Online ISSN: 1745-1337
DOI: 10.1587/transfun.E96.A.814
Print ISSN: 0916-8508
Type of Manuscript: PAPER
Category: Concurrent Systems
game theory,  multicriteria games,  evolutionarily stable strategy,  neutrally stable strategy,  

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Evolutionary stability has been discussed as a fundamental issue in single-criterion games. We extend evolutionarily and neutrally stable strategies to multicriteria games. Keeping in mind the fact that a payoff is given by a vector in multicriteria games, we provide several concepts which are coincident in single-criterion games based on partial vector orders of payoff vectors. We also investigate the hierarchical structure of our proposed evolutionarily and neutrally stable strategies. Shapley had introduced concepts such as strong and weak equilibria. We discuss the relationship between these equilibria and our proposed evolutionary stability.