For Full-Text PDF, please login, if you are a member of IEICE,|
or go to Pay Per View on menu list, if you are a nonmember of IEICE.
Finding Higher Order Differentials of MISTY1
Yukiyasu TSUNOO Teruo SAITO Takeshi KAWABATA Hirokatsu NAKAGAWA
IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences
Publication Date: 2012/06/01
Online ISSN: 1745-1337
Print ISSN: 0916-8508
Type of Manuscript: PAPER
Category: Cryptography and Information Security
block cipher, CRYPTREC, higher order differential attack, MISTY1, NESSIE,
Full Text: PDF(519.3KB)>>
MISTY1 is a 64-bit block cipher that has provable security against differential and linear cryptanalysis. MISTY1 is one of the algorithms selected in the European NESSIE project, and it is recommended for Japanese e-Government ciphers by the CRYPTREC project. In this paper, we report on 12th order differentials in 3-round MISTY1 with FL functions and 44th order differentials in 4-round MISTY1 with FL functions both previously unknown. We also report that both data complexity and computational complexity of higher order differential attacks on 6-round MISTY1 with FL functions and 7-round MISTY1 with FL functions using the 46th order differential can be reduced to as much as 1/22 of the previous values by using multiple 44th order differentials simultaneously.