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Detailed Cost Estimation of CNTW Forgery Attack against EMV Signature Scheme
Tetsuya IZU Yumi SAKEMI Masahiko TAKENAKA
IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information and Systems
Publication Date: 2011/11/01
Online ISSN: 1745-1361
Print ISSN: 0916-8532
Type of Manuscript: Special Section PAPER (Special Section on Information and Communication System Security)
ISO/IEC 9796-2 signature, EMV signature, CNTW forgery attack, cost estimation,
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EMV signature is one of specifications for authenticating credit and debit card data, which is based on ISO/IEC 9796-2 signature scheme. At CRYPTO 2009, Coron, Naccache, Tibouchi, and Weinmann proposed a new forgery attack against the signature ISO/IEC 9796-2 (CNTW attack) . They also briefly discussed the possibility when the attack is applied to the EMV signatures. They showed that the forging cost is $45,000 and concluded that the attack could not forge them for operational reason. However their results are derived from not fully analysis under only one condition. The condition they adopt is typical case. For security evaluation, fully analysis and an estimation in worst case are needed. This paper shows cost-estimation of CNTW attack against EMV signature in detail. We constitute an evaluate model and show cost-estimations under all conditions that Coron et al. do not estimate. As results, this paper contribute on two points. One is that our detailed estimation reduced the forgery cost from $45,000 to $35,200 with same condition as . Another is to clarify a fact that EMV signature can be forged with less than $2,000 according to a condition. This fact shows that CNTW attack might be a realistic threat.