How to Decide Selection Functions for Power Analysis: From the Viewpoint of Hardware Architecture of Block Ciphers

Daisuke SUZUKI  Minoru SAEKI  Koichi SHIMIZU  Tsutomu MATSUMOTO  

Publication
IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences   Vol.E94-A   No.1   pp.200-210
Publication Date: 2011/01/01
Online ISSN: 1745-1337
DOI: 10.1587/transfun.E94.A.200
Print ISSN: 0916-8508
Type of Manuscript: Special Section PAPER (Special Section on Cryptography and Information Security)
Category: Implementation
Keyword: 
hardware architecture,  differential power analysis,  correlation power analysis,  template attack,  

Full Text: PDF>>
Buy this Article




Summary: 
In this paper we first demonstrate that effective selection functions in power analysis attacks change depending on circuit architectures of a block cipher. We then conclude that the most resistant architecture on its own, in the case of the loop architecture, has two data registers have separate roles: one for storing the plaintext and ciphertext, and the other for storing intermediate values. There, the pre-whitening operation is placed at the output of the former register. The architecture allows the narrowest range of selection functions and thereby has resistance against ordinary CPA. Thus, we can easily defend against attacks by ordinary CPA at the architectural level, whereas we cannot against DPA. Secondly, we propose a new technique called "self-templates" in order to raise the accuracy of evaluation of DPA-based attacks. Self-templates enable to differentiate meaningful selection functions for DPA-based attacks without any strong assumption as in the template attack. We also present the results of attacks to an AES co-processor on an ASIC and demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed technique.