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A Design Methodology for a DPA-Resistant Circuit with RSL Techniques
Daisuke SUZUKI Minoru SAEKI Koichi SHIMIZU Akashi SATOH Tsutomu MATSUMOTO
IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences
Publication Date: 2010/12/01
Online ISSN: 1745-1337
Print ISSN: 0916-8508
Type of Manuscript: Special Section PAPER (Special Section on VLSI Design and CAD Algorithms)
Category: Logic Synthesis, Test and Verification
side-channel attacks, differential power analysis, hardware countermeasure, random switching logic, CMOS logic circuit,
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A design methodology of Random Switching Logic (RSL) using CMOS standard cell libraries is proposed to counter power analysis attacks against cryptographic hardware modules. The original RSL proposed in 2004 requires a unique RSL-gate for random data masking and glitch suppression to prevent secret information leakage through power traces. In contrast, our new methodology enables to use general logic gates supported by standard cell libraries. In order to evaluate its practical performance in hardware size and speed as well as resistance against power analysis attacks, an AES circuit with the RSL technique was implemented as a cryptographic LSI using 130-nm and 90-nm CMOS standard cell library. From the results of attack experiments that used a million traces, we confirmed that the RSL-AES circuit has very high DPA and CPA resistance thanks to the contributions of both the masking function and the glitch suppressing function.