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Successful Manipulation in Stable Marriage Model with Complete Preference Lists
Hirotatsu KOBAYASHI Tomomi MATSUI
IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information and Systems
Publication Date: 2009/02/01
Online ISSN: 1745-1361
Print ISSN: 0916-8532
Type of Manuscript: Special Section PAPER (Special Section on Foundations of Computer Science)
stable marriage, Gale-Shapley algorithm, graph theory, strategic manipulation,
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This paper deals with a strategic issue in the stable marriage model with complete preference lists (i.e., a preference list of an agent is a permutation of all the members of the opposite sex). Given complete preference lists of n men over n women, and a marriage µ, we consider the problem for finding preference lists of n women over n men such that the men-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm (Gale-Shapley algorithm) adopted to the lists produces µ. We show a simple necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a set of preference lists of women over men. Our condition directly gives an O(n2) time algorithm for finding a set of preference lists, if it exists.