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A New 'On the Fly' Identification Scheme: An Asymptoticity Trade-Off between ZK and Correctness
Bagus SANTOSO Kazuo OHTA
IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences
Publication Date: 2009/01/01
Online ISSN: 1745-1337
Print ISSN: 0916-8508
Type of Manuscript: Special Section PAPER (Special Section on Cryptography and Information Security)
Category: Secure Protocol
identification scheme, zero-knowledge, impersonation under serial active attack,
Full Text: PDF(335.1KB)>>
GPS is an efficient identification (ID) scheme based on Schnorr ID scheme designed for applications where low cost devices with limited resources are used and a very-short authentication time is required. Let P and V be a prover and a verifier in GPS and < g > be a multiplicative group. P holds a secret key S∈[0,S) and publishes I=g-s. In each elementary round: (1) P sends to Vx=gr where r is chosen randomly from [0,A), (2) V sends to P a random C∈[0,B), and (3) P sends y=r+cs (no modulus computation). Since there is no modular reduction on y, a key issue is whether GPS leaks information about s. It has been proved that GPS is statistical zero-knowledge, if in asymptotic sense, BS/A is negligible, where is the number of elementary rounds in one complete identification trial. In this paper, first we will show the followings. (1) We can construct a concrete attack procedure which reveals one bit of secret key s from the specified value range of y unless BS/A is negligible. We reconfirm that we must set A extremely large compared to BS. (2) This drawback can be avoided by modifying GPS into a new scheme, GPS+, in which P does not send the value of y in the specified range where y reveals some information about s. GPS+ ensures perfect ZK only by requiring both A > BS and A being a multiple of the order of g, while it allows an honest P to be rejected with probability at most BS/(2A) in one elementary round. Under the standard recommended parameters for 80-bit security where =1, |S|=160, and |B|=35, |A|=275 is recommended for GPS in GPS' paper. On the other hand, GPS+ can guarantee 80-bit security and less than one false rejection on average in 100 identifications with only |A|=210 with the same parameters as above. In practice, this implies 275-210=65 bits (≈24%) reductions on storage requirement. We have confirmed that the reduce of A also reduces approximately 4% of running time for online response using a certain implementation technique for GPS+ by machine experiment.