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Lightweight Privacy-Preserving Authentication Protocols Secure against Active Attack in an Asymmetric Way
Yang CUI Kazukuni KOBARA Kanta MATSUURA Hideki IMAI
Publication
IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information and Systems
Vol.E91-D
No.5
pp.1457-1465 Publication Date: 2008/05/01 Online ISSN: 1745-1361
DOI: 10.1093/ietisy/e91-d.5.1457 Print ISSN: 0916-8532 Type of Manuscript: Special Section PAPER (Special Section on Information and Communication System Security) Category: Authentication Keyword: lightweight protocol, asymmetric authentication, privacy-preserving, active attack,
Full Text: PDF>>
Summary:
As pervasive computing technologies develop fast, the privacy protection becomes a crucial issue and needs to be coped with very carefully. Typically, it is difficult to efficiently identify and manage plenty of the low-cost pervasive devices like Radio Frequency Identification Devices (RFID), without leaking any privacy information. In particular, the attacker may not only eavesdrop the communication in a passive way, but also mount an active attack to ask queries adaptively, which is obviously more dangerous. Towards settling this problem, in this paper, we propose two lightweight authentication protocols which are privacy-preserving against active attack, in an asymmetric way. That asymmetric style with privacy-oriented simplification succeeds to reduce the load of low-cost devices and drastically decrease the computation cost for the management of server. This is because that, unlike the usual management of the identities, our approach does not require any synchronization nor exhaustive search in the database, which enjoys great convenience in case of a large-scale system. The protocols are based on a fast asymmetric encryption with specialized simplification and only one cryptographic hash function, which consequently assigns an easy work to pervasive devices. Besides, our results do not require the strong assumption of the random oracle.
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