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Leakage Analysis of DPA Countermeasures at the Logic Level
Minoru SAEKI Daisuke SUZUKI Tetsuya ICHIKAWA
IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences
Publication Date: 2007/01/01
Online ISSN: 1745-1337
Print ISSN: 0916-8508
Type of Manuscript: Special Section PAPER (Special Section on Cryptography and Information Security)
Category: Side Channel Attacks
side-channel attacks, differential power analysis, hardware countermeasure, CMOS logic circuit, second-order DPA,
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In this paper, we propose new models for directly evaluating DPA leakage from logic information in CMOS circuits. These models are based on the transition probability for each gate, and are naturally applicable to various actual devices for simulating power analysis. Furthermore, we demonstrate the weakness of previously known hardware countermeasures for both our model and FPGA and suggest secure conditions for the hardware countermeasure.