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Replicator Dynamics with Government's Intervention by Collection and Reallocation of Payoffs
Takafumi KANAZAWA Toshimitsu USHIO Hayato GOTO
Publication
IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences
Vol.E90A
No.10
pp.21702177 Publication Date: 2007/10/01
Online ISSN: 17451337
DOI: 10.1093/ietfec/e90a.10.2170
Print ISSN: 09168508 Type of Manuscript: Special Section PAPER (Special Section on Nonlinear Theory and its Applications) Category: Nonlinear Phenomena and Analysis Keyword: replicator dynamics, intervention, payoff collection, payoff reallocation,
Full Text: PDF(461.7KB)>>
Summary:
In a community which consists of a large number of people interacting with each other, social dilemma is an important problem. This problem occurs when the payoff of each person conflicts with the total payoff of the community which he/she belongs to. Evolutionary game theory has been used as a powerful mathematical framework to analyze such a social problem. Recently, the authors have proposed replicator dynamics with reallocation of payoffs. In this model, the government is willing to lead the population to a desirable goal state by using collections and reallocations of payoffs. In this paper, we investigate this model, and show conditions for the goal state to be a locally or a globally asymptotically stable equilibrium point, respectively. We also propose a government's strategy depends on population states which can stabilize the goal state globally.

