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Generalized Vickrey Auction and Suppression of Active Adversary Using Incentive-Compatible Implementation
Makoto YOKOO Koutarou SUZUKI
IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences
Publication Date: 2005/01/01
Print ISSN: 0916-8508
Type of Manuscript: Special Section PAPER (Special Section on Cryptography and Information Security)
generalized Vickrey auction, combinatorial auction, mechanism design, game-theory,
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This paper presents an attempt to make rational active adversary passive using mechanism design. We propose a secure Generalized Vickrey Auction (GVA) scheme where the procedure executed by a bidder affects neither the prices nor the allocation of the bidder. Therefore, a bidder does not have an incentive to be an active adversary.