Generalized Vickrey Auction and Suppression of Active Adversary Using Incentive-Compatible Implementation

Makoto YOKOO  Koutarou SUZUKI  

Publication
IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences   Vol.E88-A   No.1   pp.255-261
Publication Date: 2005/01/01
Online ISSN: 
DOI: 10.1093/ietfec/e88-a.1.255
Print ISSN: 0916-8508
Type of Manuscript: Special Section PAPER (Special Section on Cryptography and Information Security)
Category: Application
Keyword: 
generalized Vickrey auction,  combinatorial auction,  mechanism design,  game-theory,  

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Summary: 
This paper presents an attempt to make rational active adversary passive using mechanism design. We propose a secure Generalized Vickrey Auction (GVA) scheme where the procedure executed by a bidder affects neither the prices nor the allocation of the bidder. Therefore, a bidder does not have an incentive to be an active adversary.