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Key Substitution Attacks on Some Provably Secure Signature Schemes
IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences
Publication Date: 2004/01/01
Print ISSN: 0916-8508
Type of Manuscript: Special Section LETTER (Special Section on Cryptography and Information Security)
cryptography, key substitution attacks,
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Recently, Camenisch et al. and Fischlin proposed provably secure signature schemes in the standard models respectively. In this letter, we propose key substitution attacks on these two signature schemes. We show that an adversary can generate a valid public key corresponding to a legitimate signature.