Random-Error Resilience of a Short Collusion-Secure Code

Katsunari YOSHIOKA  Tsutomu MATSUMOTO  

IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences   Vol.E86-A    No.5    pp.1147-1155
Publication Date: 2003/05/01
Online ISSN: 
Print ISSN: 0916-8508
Type of Manuscript: Special Section PAPER (Special Section on Discrete Mathematics and Its Applications)
fingerprinting,  collusion attack,  collusion-secure code,  

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The c-Secure CRT code is a collusion-secure fingerprinting code whose code length is reduced by using the Chinese Remainder Theorem. The tracing algorithm for the c-secure CRT code drops its performance of traitor tracing when random errors are added to the codewords. In this paper, we show two approaches to enhance random-error-resilience to the tracing algorithm of the c-secure CRT code. The first approach is introducing thresholds for the distinction of the detected part of the embedded data called detected blocks. We propose a method to derive appropriate values of the thresholds on an assumption that the tracer can estimate the random error rate. This modification extends the capability of traitor tracing to the attacks in which the alteration rate of the detected blocks is not fixed to 0.5. The second approach is extending the scope of the search for the detected blocks. With numerical results by computer simulations, we confirmed an impressive improvement of random-error-resilience of a c-secure CRT code.