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Remarks on the Unknown Key Share Attacks
Joonsang BAEK Kwangjo KIM
IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences
Publication Date: 2000/12/25
Print ISSN: 0916-8508
Type of Manuscript: LETTER
Category: Information Security
unknown key-share attack, duplicate-signature key selection, public key substitution, key agreement protocol,
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This letter points out some flaws in the previous works on UKS (unknown key-share) attacks. We show that Blake-Wilson and Menezes' revised STS-MAC (Station-to-Station Message Authentication Code) protocol, which was proposed to prevent UKS attack, is still vulnerable to a new UKS attack. Also, Hirose and Yoshida's key agreement protocol presented at PKC'98 is shown to be insecure against public key substitution UKS attacks. Finally, we discuss countermeasures for such UKS attacks.