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Differential-Linear Cryptanalysis of FEAL-8
Kazumaro AOKI Kazuo OHTA
IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences
Publication Date: 1996/01/25
Print ISSN: 0916-8508
Type of Manuscript: Special Section PAPER (Special Section on Cryptography and Information Security)
code break, block cipher, differential-linear cryptanalysis, FEAL,
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In CRYPTO '94, Langford and Hellman attacked DES reduced to 8-round in the chosen plaintext scenario by their "differential-1inear cryptanalysis," which is a combination of differential cryptanalysis and linear cryptanalysis. In this paper, a historical review of differential-linear cryptanalysis, our formalization of differential-linear cryptanalysis, and the application of differential-linear cryptanalysis to FEAL-8 are presented. As a result, though the previous best method (differential cryptanalysis) required 128 chosen plaintexts, only 12 chosen plaintexts are sufficient, in computer experimentations, to attack FEAL-8.