Strongly Secure Identity-Based Key Exchange with Single Pairing Operation

Junichi TOMIDA  Atsushi FUJIOKA  Akira NAGAI  Koutarou SUZUKI  

IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences   Vol.E104-A   No.1   pp.58-68
Publication Date: 2021/01/01
Online ISSN: 1745-1337
DOI: 10.1587/transfun.2020CIP0010
Type of Manuscript: Special Section PAPER (Special Section on Cryptography and Information Security)
identity-based authenticated group key exchange,  id-eCK security,  asymmetric pairing,  external Diffie-Hellman for target group assumption,  q-gap-bilinear collision attack assumption,  HMQV construction,  NAXOS technique,  

Full Text: PDF(1.2MB)>>
Buy this Article

This paper proposes an id-eCK secure identity-based authenticated key exchange (ID-AKE) scheme, where the id-eCK security implies that a scheme resists against leakage of all combinations of master, static, and ephemeral secret keys except ones trivially break the security. Most existing id-eCK secure ID-AKE schemes require two symmetric pairing operations or a greater number of asymmetric pairing, which is faster than symmetric one, operations to establish a session key. However, our scheme is realized with a single asymmetric pairing operation for each party, and this is an advantage in efficiency. The proposed scheme is based on the ID-AKE scheme by McCullagh and Barreto, which is vulnerable to an active attack. To achieve id-eCK security, we apply the HMQV construction and the NAXOS technique to the McCullagh-Barreto scheme. The id-eCK security is proved under the external Diffie-Hellman for target group assumption and the q-gap-bilinear collision attack assumption.