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Identification of Kernel Memory Corruption Using Kernel Memory Secret Observation Mechanism
Hiroki KUZUNO Toshihiro YAMAUCHI
IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information and Systems
Publication Date: 2020/07/01
Online ISSN: 1745-1361
Type of Manuscript: Special Section PAPER (Special Section on Information and Communication System Security)
Category: Network and System Security
memory corruption, virtual memory management, system security, operating system,
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Countermeasures against attacks targeting an operating system are highly effective in preventing security compromises caused by kernel vulnerability. An adversary uses such attacks to overwrite credential information, thereby overcoming security features through arbitrary program execution. CPU features such as Supervisor Mode Access Prevention, Supervisor Mode Execution Prevention and the No eXecute bit facilitate access permission control and data execution in virtual memory. Additionally, Linux reduces actual attacks through kernel vulnerability affects via several protection methods including Kernel Address Space Layout Randomization, Control Flow Integrity, and Kernel Page Table Isolation. Although the combination of these methods can mitigate attacks as kernel vulnerability relies on the interaction between the user and the kernel modes, kernel virtual memory corruption can still occur (e.g., the eBPF vulnerability allows malicious memory overwriting only in the kernel mode). We present the Kernel Memory Observer (KMO), which has a secret observation mechanism to monitor kernel virtual memory. KMO is an alternative design for virtual memory can detect illegal data manipulation/writing in the kernel virtual memory. KMO determines kernel virtual memory corruption, inspects system call arguments, and forcibly unmaps the direct mapping area. An evaluation of KMO reveals that it can detect kernel virtual memory corruption that contains the defeating security feature through actual kernel vulnerabilities. In addition, the results indicate that the system call overhead latency ranges from 0.002 µs to 8.246 µs, and the web application benchmark ranges from 39.70 µs to 390.52 µs for each HTTP access, whereas KMO reduces these overheads by using tag-based Translation Lookaside Buffers.