Probabilistic Analysis of Differential Fault Attack on MIBS

Yang GAO  Yong-juan WANG  Qing-jun YUAN  Tao WANG  Xiang-bin WANG  

IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information and Systems   Vol.E102-D   No.2   pp.299-306
Publication Date: 2019/02/01
Online ISSN: 1745-1361
DOI: 10.1587/transinf.2018EDP7168
Type of Manuscript: PAPER
Category: Information Network
lightweight block cipher,  MIBS algorithm,  differential fault attack,  probabilistic model,  

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We propose a new method of differential fault attack, which is based on the nibble-group differential diffusion property of the lightweight block cipher MIBS. On the basis of the statistical regularity of differential distribution of the S-box, we establish a statistical model and then analyze the relationship between the number of faults injections, the probability of attack success, and key recovering bits. Theoretically, time complexity of recovering the main key reduces to 22 when injecting 3 groups of faults (12 nibbles in total) in 30,31 and 32 rounds, which is the optimal condition. Furthermore, we calculate the expectation of the number of fault injection groups needed to recover 62 bits in main key, which is 3.87. Finally, experimental data verifies the correctness of the theoretical model.