A Stackelberg Game-Theoretic Solution to Win-Win Situation: A Presale Mechanism in Spectrum Market

Wei BAI  Yuli ZHANG  Meng WANG  Jin CHEN  Han JIANG  Zhan GAO  Donglin JIAO  

IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information and Systems   Vol.E102-D    No.12    pp.2607-2610
Publication Date: 2019/12/01
Publicized: 2019/08/28
Online ISSN: 1745-1361
DOI: 10.1587/transinf.2019EDL8095
Type of Manuscript: LETTER
Category: Information Network
spectrum pool,  presale mechanism,  Stackelberg game,  Stackelberg equilibrium,  

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This paper investigates the spectrum allocation problem. Under the current spectrum management mode, large amount of spectrum resource is wasted due to uncertainty of user's demand. To reduce the impact of uncertainty, a presale mechanism is designed based on spectrum pool. In this mechanism, the spectrum manager provides spectrum resource at a favorable price for presale aiming at sharing with user the risk caused by uncertainty of demand. Because of the hierarchical characteristic, we build a spectrum market Stackelberg game, in which the manager acts as leader and user as follower. Then proof of the uniqueness and optimality of Stackelberg Equilibrium is given. Simulation results show the presale mechanism can promote profits for both sides and reduce temporary scheduling.