The Structural Vulnerability Analysis of Power Grids Based on Second-Order Centrality

Zhong-Jian KANG  Yi-Jia ZHANG  Xin-Ling GUO  Zhe-Ming LU  

IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences   Vol.E100-A   No.7   pp.1567-1570
Publication Date: 2017/07/01
Online ISSN: 1745-1337
DOI: 10.1587/transfun.E100.A.1567
Type of Manuscript: LETTER
Category: Systems and Control
power grids,  complex networks,  vulnerability,  centrality,  second-order centrality,  

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The application of complex network theory to power grid analysis has been a hot topic in recent years, which mainly manifests itself in four aspects. The first aspect is to model power system networks. The second aspect is to reveal the topology of the grid itself. The third aspect is to reveal the inherent vulnerability and weakness of the power network itself and put forward the pertinent improvement measures to provide guidance for the construction of power grid. The last aspect is to analyze the mechanism of cascading failure and establish the cascading fault model of large power failure. In the past ten years, by using the complex network theory, many researchers have investigated the structural vulnerability of power grids from the point of view of topology. This letter studies the structural vulnerability of power grids according to the effect of selective node removal. We apply several kinds of node centralities including recently-presented second-order centrality (SOC) to guide the node removal attack. We test the effectiveness of all these centralities in guiding the node removal based on several IEEE power grids. Simulation results show that, compared with other node centralities, the SOC is relatively effective in guiding the node removal and can destroy the power grid with negative degree-degree correlation in less steps.