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Two-Level Bargaining Game Modeling for Cooperation Stimulation in Spectrum Leasing
Biling ZHANG Kai CHEN Jung-lang YU Shiduan CHENG
IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Communications
Publication Date: 2013/07/01
Online ISSN: 1745-1345
Print ISSN: 0916-8516
Type of Manuscript: PAPER
Category: Wireless Communication Technologies
cognitive radio, spectrum leasing, cooperative game theory, Nash Bargaining Solution, cooperative transmission,
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In cognitive radio networks, the primary user (PU) can lease a fraction of its licensed spectrum to the secondary users (SUs) in exchange for their cooperative transmission if it has a minimum transmission rate requirement and is experiencing a bad channel condition. However, due to the selfish nature of the SUs, they may not cooperate to meet the PU's Quality of Service (QoS) requirement. On the other hand, the SUs may not exploit efficiently the benefit from cooperation if they compete with each other and collaborate with the PU independently. Therefore, when SUs belong to the same organization and can work as a group, how to stimulate them to cooperate with the PU and thus guarantee the PU's QoS requirement, and how to coordinate the usage of rewarded spectrum among these SUs after cooperation are critical challenges. In this paper, we propose a two-level bargaining framework to address the aforementioned problems. In the proposed framework, the interactions between the PU and the SUs are modeled as the upper level bargaining game while the lower level bargaining game is used to formulate the SUs' decision making process on spectrum sharing. We analyze the optimal actions of the users and derive the theoretic results for the one-PU one-SU scenario. To find the solutions for the one-PU multi-SU scenario, we put forward a revised numerical searching algorithm and prove its convergence. Finally, we demonstrate the effectiveness and efficiency of the proposed scheme through simulations.