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Attacks on the Shen et al.'s Timestamp-Based Password Authentication Scheme Using Smart Cards
Eun-Jun YOON Eun-Kyung RYU Kee-Young YOO
IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences
Publication Date: 2005/01/01
Print ISSN: 0916-8508
Type of Manuscript: Special Section LETTER (Special Section on Cryptography and Information Security)
cryptography, password, authentication, security, smart card,
Full Text: PDF(63.4KB)
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In 2003, Shen et al. proposed an improvement on Yang-Shieh's timestamp-based password authentication scheme using smart cards. Then they claimed that their scheme cannot withstand a forged login attack, but also eliminate a problem of Yang-Shieh's. However, their scheme is still susceptible to forged login attack. In this letter, we show how the forged login attack can be worked out on Shen et al.'s scheme.