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Nash Equilibria in Combinatorial Auctions with Item Bidding and Subadditive Symmetric Valuations
Hiroyuki UMEDA Takao ASANO
IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences
Publication Date: 2018/09/01
Online ISSN: 1745-1337
Type of Manuscript: Special Section PAPER (Special Section on Discrete Mathematics and Its Applications)
Nash equilibrium, combinatorial auction, price of anarchy, social welfare problem, subadditivity,
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We discuss Nash equilibria in combinatorial auctions with item bidding. Specifically, we give a characterization for the existence of a Nash equilibrium in a combinatorial auction with item bidding when valuations by n bidders satisfy symmetric and subadditive properties. By this characterization, we can obtain an algorithm for deciding whether a Nash equilibrium exists in such a combinatorial auction.