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On the Security of NonInteractive Key Exchange against RelatedKey Attacks
Hiraku MORITA Jacob C.N. SCHULDT Takahiro MATSUDA Goichiro HANAOKA Tetsu IWATA
Publication
IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences
Vol.E100A
No.9
pp.19101923 Publication Date: 2017/09/01
Online ISSN: 17451337 Type of Manuscript: Special Section PAPER (Special Section on Discrete Mathematics and Its Applications) Category: Keyword: relatedkey attacks, NonInteractive Key Exchange, DiffieHellman key exchange scheme,
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Summary:
NonInteractive Key Exchange (NIKE) is a cryptographic primitive that allows two users to compute a shared key without any interaction. The DiffieHellman key exchange scheme is probably the most wellknown example of a NIKE scheme. Freire et al. (PKC 2013) defined four security notions for NIKE schemes, and showed implications among them. In these notions, we consider an adversary that is challenged to distinguish a shared key of a new pair of users from a random value, using only its knowledge of keys shared between other pairs of users. To take into account sidechannel attacks such as tampering and faultinjection attacks, Bellare and Kohno (Eurocrypt 2003) formalized relatedkey attacks (RKA), where stronger adversaries are considered. In this paper, we introduce four RKA security notions for NIKE schemes. In these notions, we consider an adversary that can also manipulate the secret keys of users and obtain shared keys computed under the modified secret keys. We also show implications and separations among the security notions, and prove that one of the NIKE schemes proposed by Freire et al. is secure in the strongest RKA sense in the random oracle model under the Double Strong DiffieHellman (DSDH) assumption over the group of signed quadratic residues, which is implied by the factoring assumption.

