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Simple Anonymous Password-Based Authenticated Key Exchange (SAPAKE), Reconsidered
SeongHan SHIN Kazukuni KOBARA
IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences
Publication Date: 2017/02/01
Online ISSN: 1745-1337
Type of Manuscript: PAPER
Category: Cryptography and Information Security
password, authentication, anonymity, provable security,
Full Text: PDF(926.7KB)
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Anonymous password-based authentication protocols are designed to provide not only password-based authentication but also client anonymity. In , Qian et al. proposed a simple anonymous password-based authentication protocol (SAPAKE). In this paper, we reconsider the SAPAKE protocol  by first showing that an (third party) active attacker can impersonate the server and compute a session key with probability 1. After giving a formal model that captures such attacks, we propose a simple and secure anonymous password-based authentication (for short, S2APA) protocol that provides security against modification attacks on protocol-specific values and is more efficient than YZWB09/10 ,  and SAPAKE . Also, we prove that the S2APA protocol is AKE-secure against active attacks as well as modification attacks under the computational Diffie-Hellman problem in the random oracle model, and provides unconditional client anonymity against a semi-honest server, who honestly follows the protocol.