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A Cheating-Detectable (k, L, n) Ramp Secret Sharing Scheme
Wataru NAKAMURA Hirosuke YAMAMOTO Terence CHAN
IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences
Publication Date: 2017/12/01
Online ISSN: 1745-1337
Type of Manuscript: Special Section PAPER (Special Section on Information Theory and Its Applications)
Category: Cryptography and Information Security
ramp secret sharing schemes, cheating detection, impersonation attacks, substitution attacks, mutual information of shares,
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In this paper, we treat (k, L, n) ramp secret sharing schemes (SSSs) that can detect impersonation attacks and/or substitution attacks. First, we derive lower bounds on the sizes of the shares and random number used in encoding for given correlation levels, which are measured by the mutual information of shares. We also derive lower bounds on the success probabilities of attacks for given correlation levels and given sizes of shares. Next we propose a strong (k, L, n) ramp SSS against substitution attacks. As far as we know, the proposed scheme is the first strong (k, L, n) ramp SSSs that can detect substitution attacks of at most k-1 shares. Our scheme can be applied to a secret SL uniformly distributed over GF(pm)L, where p is a prime number with p≥L+2. We show that for a certain type of correlation levels, the proposed scheme can achieve the lower bounds on the sizes of the shares and random number, and can reduce the success probability of substitution attacks within nearly L times the lower bound when the number of forged shares is less than k. We also evaluate the success probability of impersonation attack for our schemes. In addition, we give some examples of insecure ramp SSSs to clarify why each component of our scheme is essential to realize the required security.